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1Introduction
This paper presents a dynamic model of interrelated factor demand under uncertainty with
nonconvex adjustment costs. The model’s solution in closed form reveals that the probability of
simultaneous adjustment (synchronization) depends largely on the interrelation and especially on
the question whether or not interrelation adds to the costs of changing inputs or lowers those costs.
The answer to that question will vary from project to project.
Recent empirical studies by Sakellaris (2004) and Letterie, Pfann and Polder (2004) have
revealed that in the context of lumpy adjustment the dynamics of labour and capital demand are
interrelated. In particular, these papers have shown that at the micro level investment and labour
spikes are synchronized to a large extent. Contreras (2006) investigates interrelation for a glass
mould firm using simulated moments and calibration. He finds that it is more costly for the firm to
adjust capital and employment at the same time rather than sequentially. Nadiri and Rosen (1969)
and Merz and Yashiv (2007) have studied the topic of interrelation at the macro level in a traditional
framework without nonconvex costs of adjustment. In this paper we develop a theoretical model in
which a firm decides about the optimal level of two production factors. Adjustments of these factors
involve nonconvex adjustment costs. We refer to these factors as capital and labour but it can also
describe the behaviour of a firm deciding about any two different input types (for instance R&D and
natural resources).
Our model deviates from work by Eberly and Van Mieghem (1997), Dixit (1997) and
Bloom (2007). We allow for the possibility that adjustment costs decrease or increase when the firm
decides to adjust two factors simultaneously. In order to derive the closed form solution we will use
the similar continuous time framework advanced by Abel and Eberly (1994). The closed form
solution of the firm’s optimization problem is important since it will allow us to investigate under
which conditions interrelation is relevant.
2The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1 we develop the model. In section 2 we argue that
large fixed costs of adjustment dampen the role played by the cost of interrelation. Finally, section 3
concludes.
1. The model
Consider a firm that employs two production factors (capital Kt and labour Lt in year t) to produce a
non-storable output. The firm’s management maximizes V(.) denoting the present discounted value
of the revenue resulting from its business operations. The objective function is given by the value of
the firm represented by
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The discount rate is given by b  with 10 << b . The operating profit of the firm at year t is equal to
( ) ( )tttttttttt LHKICLwLKF ,,,,, --= ep . The variable tw denotes the wage paid by the firm to a full
time worker. Investment and hiring (or firing) are denoted by It and Ht respectively. Sales are given
by the expression ( )ttt LKF e,,  where the term te  represents a variable capturing randomness in
technology or stochastic behaviour of the demand conditions the firm is facing. The stochastic term
te  evolves according to
( ) ( ) dzd ttt ×+= eseme (2)
where dz is a standard Wiener process.
When adjusting the stock of capital or the number of workers the firm incurs adjustment
costs defined as:
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In the adjustment cost function ( )tttt LHKIC ,,,  the indicator function ( ).I  assumes the value 1 if the
condition in brackets is satisfied and equals zero otherwise. The purchase price of capital is given
by +Itp . In case the firm sells capital we assume that the price received for one unit of capital
equals -Itp . Due to irreversibility of investment decisions
-+ > It
I
t pp .
1 Linear adjustment costs with
respect to hiring and firing are denoted by +Htp when 0>tH and
-H
tp  when 0<tH . The convex
costs are represented by conventional quadratic functions in
t
t
K
I
and
t
t
L
H
.2 The fixed costs
associated with adjusting capital and labour are represented by Ka  and La  respectively and we
assume that both parameters are nonnegative and do not depend on whether tI and tH are positive or
negative. Fixed costs can be a result of the firm’s production processes being disrupted when
1 Note that the actual investment costs are incorporated in the adjustment costs function in its linear
part.
2 It is straightforward to extend this adjustment cost function with a term capturing convex costs of
interrelation like .10 where1 <<××÷
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I  We  abstract  from  this  possibility  to
facilitate notation and hence enhance readability of the paper, but the extension is available upon
request. We note that in the figures presented later in this paper the area where simultaneous
adjustment (??0 and ??0) takes place becomes defined by curved boundaries rather than straight
lines if .0¹g
4adjustment of capital or labour takes place. Alternatively, the firm’s management may have to
spend costly time guiding these organizational changes. We also assume that if the firm adjusts
labour or capital, then the adjustment costs of the other factor demand component are affected. The
term KLa is positive if simultaneous adjustment of capital and labour forces the management to
spend additional time and effort on the joint adjustment, or that the adjustment causes a more severe
production interruption compared to when capital or labour adjustments are undertaken at separate
points in time. On the other hand, the expression KLa is negative if the firm’s managers save time or
if the firm can save on costs of disruption when adjusting the factors jointly.
The firm decides upon the optimal size of the capital stock, tK , by setting investment tI  at
the appropriate level. Since capital depreciates at rate Kd , the stock of capital evolves according to
the law of motion
( ) dtKIdK tKtt ×-= d . (4)
Simultaneously, the firm determines the optimal value for the number of workers tL  by choosing
the desired and hence optimal level of hiring or firing denoted by tH . The amount of labour evolves
according to
( ) dtLHdL tLtt ×-= d , (5)
where Ld  measures the autonomous quit rate of workers.
To obtain the optimal values for tI and tH equation (1) can be optimized with respect to
these decision variables subject to the laws of motion governing the dynamics of capital, labour and
te  as given by equations (4), (5) and (2). Before proceeding we note that the variables
K
tl and
L
tl
are conventional marginal Q variables.3 Abel and Eberly (1994) show that the optimal decisions
within this framework can be solved by
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The optimal amount of investment and hiring or firing are4
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Due to the presence of fixed costs of adjustment the firm will not always follow the decision rules
presented in equation (7). Sometimes it may be optimal to abstain from adjusting capital and or
adjusting labour. The threshold equation determining whether to change the stock of capital and or
to adjust labour becomes
( )tttttLttKt LHKICHI ,,,³+ ll (8)
The left hand side of (8) measures the expected benefits of changing capital and or labour, whereas
the right hand side denotes the cost associated with the firm’s decisions. It can be shown that
equation (8) holds if
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To solve the optimization problem of the firm we derive the conditions necessary for various
adjustment decisions.
4 The first order conditions for investment and labour adjustment are
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61a. Simultaneous change increases the cost of adjustment: 0>KLa
The firm regards adjusting the stock of capital goods to be desirable if ( )
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Hence, a necessary condition for changing the amount of capital is
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A similar necessary condition for hiring or firing workers is ( )
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Equations (10) and (11) show that if the net benefits of adjusting capital and labour do not exceed a
certain minimum threshold, the management will decide to abstain adjusting. These two thresholds
are caused by the existence of the fixed adjustment costs.
Consider now the case where both necessary conditions to adjust capital and labour are
satisfied as given in equations (10) and (11). Hence, the firm has an incentive to adjust at least one
factor of production. However, due to the cost of interrelation the firm may need to select adjusting
only  one  factor  to  maximise  its  objective  function.  It  is  optimal  to  adjust  the  number  of  workers
rather than the stock of capital if
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We can also rewrite this condition as:
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7The first term on the RHS of this expression is positive given our assumptions about the adjustment
costs parameters and the content in the squared bracket is also positive according to eq. (10). Thus,
the sum of the two terms is positive. Hence it is optimal to adjust labour rather than capital if
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Under certain conditions it is optimal to adjust only one input factor, because of the cost of
interrelation. It is optimal to adjust an additional factor of production if the net benefits associated
with that adjustment exceed the fixed costs of that second input ( Ka  or La ) plus the cost of
interrelation 0>KLa .  Hence,  it  is  worth  also  adjusting  the  stock  of  capital  (given  that  adjusting
labour yields a higher value of the firm if only one input needs to be selected) as soon as
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Similarly, labour will also be adjusted (given that changing capital yields a higher firm value if only
one input is selected) as soon as
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Hence, the boundaries determining when the firm will adjust both factors of production are
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The analysis of firm level capital and labour demand decisions is summarized in figure 1.
The curved boundary in figure 1 crosses the rectangular areas at KL AA =  and KL BB = .5 The firm
5 This curve corresponding to the right hand side of equation (13) is concave if LK aa > .
Hence in figure 1 we depict the case LK aa >  where the curved boundary crosses the horizontal
8only adjusts the two factors of production in the area depicted in the upper right corner of the
figure. This area moves further away from the origin if KLa increases lowering the likelihood of
simultaneous adjustment. In fact, higher interrelated adjustment costs, ?KL, increase the distance
between AK and BK, and between AL and BL. This means that the net benefit of changes, ItKt p-l
and Ht
L
t p-l , need to be sufficiently large for the firm to choose to change both input factors
simultaneously.
*** Insert figure 1 about here ***
1b. Simultaneous adjustment decreases cost of adjustment: 0£KLa
If 0£KLa firms actually benefit from adjusting both input factors simultaneously. The above
analysis can be applied to a large extent here as well. The main difference is that the choice between
investment or labour adjustment as presented below equation (12) has become irrelevant in this
case. This is due to the fact that the thresholds BL and BK are smaller than AL and AK respectively if
0£KLa (also see equations 10, 11 and 15). Figure 2 indicates that if the firm incurs lower
adjustment costs because of simultaneous adjustment the incidence of this event becomes more
likely. If KLa decreases then the area representing the situation that the firm changes both labour
and capital moves in the direction of the origin of the figure, meaning that joint adjustment becomes
axis (i.e. where 0|| =- Ht
L
t pl ) at
( )
t
LKK
k K
bx aa -º 2 . If KL aa >  the right hand side of equation
(13) is convex and the curved boundary crosses the vertical axis (i.e. where 0|| =- It
K
t pl ) at
( )
t
KLL
L L
by aa -º 2 . Note that if KL aa = the boundary determining whether to invest or adjust
labour becomes a straight line.
9more likely. If 0£+ KLL aa , the horizontal threshold at BL will lie at the horizontal axis of figure 2.
This means if the firm invests it will also change its labour force, i.e. the area ??0 , H=0 disappears.
If 0£+ KLK aa  then the firm will always invest as soon as it alters its number of workers because
the vertical threshold at BK will hit the vertical axis of the figure and the area I=0, ??0 vanishes. If
both conditions 0£+ KLK aa  and 0£+ KLL aa  hold  then  the  firm  will  always  change  the  two
factors of production at the same time.
*** Insert figure 2 about here ***
2. Large fixed costs dampen importance of interrelation
It  is  worth noting that if  the fixed costs of adjustment Ka  and La  increase, the interrelated cost
measured by ?KL plays a decreasing role in determining the optimal decisions of the firm. It is
straightforward to show that 0|| <
¶
-¶
i
ii AB
a
 and 0||lim =-
¥®
ii AB
ia
 for { }LKi ,Î . This means that
in figures 1 and 2 the area where the firm completely abstains from adjusting (I=0 and H=0) and
the area where both factors are adjusted simultaneously (??0 and ??0) tend to move closer to each
other as the fixed costs become larger. Hence, large fixed costs will suppress the effect of
interrelation. In figure 3 we depict the case where the fixed costs of capital are much larger than the
fixed costs of labour. In the area where only one factor is adjusted and both shadow values are large
in absolute value the event of joint adjustment can be sensitive to small changes in the shadow
value of capital but relatively unresponsive to changes in the shadow value of labour.
*** Insert figure 3 about here ***
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3. Conclusion
If it is costly to adjust two factors of production at the same time a firm has an incentive to conduct
a one at a time policy: adjust only one factor. Recent empirical studies indicate that large
adjustments tend to be synchronized in some data sets, and in others they are not. In this paper we
show that this feature of the data may be consistent with the hypothesis that joint adjustment
increases or reduces the overall costs of adjustment (i.e. 0>KLa or 0£KLa ). We also found that
when fixed costs of adjustment are large then the role played by the cost of interrelation may be
minor. Hence, synchronization may occur because large fixed costs dampen the relative importance
of interrelation. Moreover, the dynamics of factor demand are also determined by the shadow
values (i.e. It
K
t p-l and
H
t
L
t p-l ). If these shadow values are positively correlated then joint
adjustment is likely.
Demand  for  both  factors  is  non-zero  if || It
K
t p-l and ||
H
t
L
t p-l  are high. For instance, a
high positive demand shock may increase Ktl and
L
tl  simultaneously and hence provide the firm an
incentive to expand the scale of the firm by increasing both factors of production. On the other
hand, a firm may be increasing one input and decreasing the other input at the same time if shadow
values move in opposite directions. Such a situation may arise due to a policy change affecting the
relative price of the two factors of production or due to a technology shock changing the optimal
share of the inputs to produce a certain level of output. But whether the adjustments of the input
factors are made simultaneously or sequentially depends on the size of the interrelated adjustment
costs.
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Figure 1: Simultaneous change increases adjustment costs: 0>KLa
Notes:
See the main text for definitions of xK, AK, BK, AL and BL.
Parameters satisfy 0>+ KLL aa ; 0>+ KLK aa
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Figure 2: Simultaneous change reduces adjustment costs: 0<KLa .
Notes: See notes of Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Fixed adjustment costs of capital are much larger than fixed adjustment costs of
labour: LK aa >> .
Notes: See notes of Figure1 and 0>KLa .
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